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WoRKMEN's COMPENSATION ACTs-DENIAL OF COMl\ION LAw REMEDY FOR
AssoCIATED INJURIES NoT CovERED BY ACT-While employed by defendant,
plaintiff suffered severe bums and received compensation for a permanent partial
disability under the applicable workmen's compensation act. 1 He then brought an
action for damages for disfigurement, not compensable under the act, on the theory
that acceptance of statutory compensation did not deprive him of his common
law remedy for injuries not within the scope of the act. Held, the statutory remedy
is exclusive; plaintiff cannot recover for associated injuries outside the act. Morgan
v. Ray L. Smith & Son, Inc., (D.C. Kan. 1948) 79 F. Supp. 971.
By the great weight of authority, where an injury does not fall within the purview of a workmen's compensation act the common law remedy is not affected. 2
This view is commonly justified on the theory that the legislature could not have·
intended to destroy common law causes of action without substituting statutory
remedies.3 Conversely, it is generally held that if the injury is covered by a compensation act, the act is exclusive and no common law action remains. 4 Thus, an election to come under the act would seem to preclude any negligence action for a
compensable injury.;; However, when the act provides compensation for only part
of the injury sustained, the question arises whether a common law damage action
may be maintained for that part of the injury not within the scope of the act. The
prevailing view is that of the instant case; the act is exclusive though it grants only
a partial recovery. 0 While there is authority otherwise,7 it is submitted that this

Iowa Code (1946) §85.35.
Barrencotto v. Cocker Saw Co., 266 N.Y. 139, 194 N.E. 61 (1934); 71 C.J., Workmen's Compensation Acts, !11493 (1935).
3 Donnelly v. Minneapolis Mfg. Co., 161 Minn. 240, 201 N.W. 305 (1924); Cox v.
U.S. Coal & Coke Co., 80 W.Va. 295, 92 S.E. 559 (1917).
4 Most acts are exclusive by express legislative statement. See l SCHNEIDER, WoRKMEN's CoMPENSATION TEXT, §§102-154 (1941).
a "It [the compensation act] does not merely deny a right of action, but abolishes all
civil actions and all civil causes of action to which he [employee] might have resorted, as
well as the jurisdiction of the courts to entertain such causes." Ross v. Erickson Const. Co.,
89 Wash. 634 at 645 and 646, 155 P. 153 (1916).
HPROSSER, ToRTS, §69 (1941); 71 C.J., Workmen's Compensation Acts, §1493 (1935).
Relief has been denied on grounds of (I) res judicata, (2) estoppel and (3) splitting a cause
of action. Seel SCHNEIDER, WoRKMEN's COMPENSATION TEXT, §99 et seq. (1941); Hyett
v. Northwestern Hospital, 147 Minn. 413, 180 N.W. 552, (1920).
7 Boyer v. Crescent Paper Box Factory, Inc., 143 La. 368, 78 S. 596 (1918); Shinnick
v. Clover Farms Co., 90 Misc. 1, 152 N.Y.S. 649 (1915). But see Connors v. Semet-Solvay
Co., 94 Misc. 405, 159 N.Y.S. 431 (1916).
l
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,•iew is sound and in accord with the legislative policy underlying the compensation acts. The legislative policy is to compensate injured workmen for loss of
earning capacity and wages on a theory of strict liability; the statutes do not provide
remuneration for associated injuries not impairing earning power, such as pain and
suffering,8 impotency,0 disfigurement10 and exemplary damages.11 Thus, eliminating the common law defenses of assumption of risk, contributory negligence
and the fellow servant doctrine as to injuries affecting earning power, they remove
the possibility of non-recovery present under common law12 and assure the employee and his family support during the disability at a minimum outlay of time
and money. 13 For this assurance, common law causes of action are relinquished.14
The employee commonly has the option of accepting the provisions of the act
or preserving his common law rights, but the election to come under the act usually
must be made before the injury occurs or soon after accepting employment.us
While it may appear that hardship results in situations typified by the principal
case, substantial justice is generally accomplished since in most such cases the
employee could recover nothing at common law. If the compensation is deemed
inadequate the subject is a proper one for legislative consideration.

Colvin A. Peterson, Jr.
s Odom v. Arkansas Pipe Co., 208 Ark. 678, 187 S.W. (2d) 320 (1945).
o Hyett v. Northwestern Hospital, 147 Minn. 413, 180 N.W. 552 (1920); Freese v.
Morrell & Co., 58 S.D. 634, 237 N.W. 886 (1931).
10 Connors v. Semet-Solvay Co., supra, note 7.
llStricklen v, Pearson Const. Co., 185 Iowa 95, 169 N.W. 628 (1918).
12 It is variously estimated that from 70'/c, to 94% of industrial accidents were not
actionable at common law. PROSSER, TORTS, §69 (1941).
131 SCHNEIDER, WonxMEN's CoMPENSATION TEXT, §3 (1941). See Jensen v. So.
Pac. Co., 215 N.Y. 514 at 527, 109 N.E. 600 (1915), reversed on other grounds, 244 U.S.
205, 37 S.Ct. 524 (1917).
H"The legislative intent was evident to award compensation for all accidental injuries
arising out of or in the course of employment • • • and not to divide up such injuries and
award compensation for a portion thereof and leave to the injured employe a remedy for the
remainder.••• The compensation provided was intended to be exclusive, and a right of
action in the courts therefor was abolished." Adams v. !ten Biscuit Co., 63 Okla. 52 at 61,
162 P. 938 (1917).
luRoy v. Mutual Rice Co., 177 La. 883, 149 S. 508 (1933). New Hampshire permits
election after the injury. N.H. Rev. Laws, (1942) c. 216, §12. See Robert v. Hillsborough
Mills, 85 N.H. 517, 161 A. 29 (1932). Some acts are compulsory as to certain employments and a few are compulsory as to all, permitting no right of election. See N.Y. Workmen's Compensation Law (McKinney, 1946) §§10-11.

